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Abstract—This paper presents a MaxSAT benchmark focused
on identifying critical nodes in AND/OR graphs. We use AND/OR
graphs to model Industrial Control Systems (ICS) as they are able
to semantically grasp intricate logical interdependencies among
ICS components. However, identifying critical nodes in AND/OR
graphs is an NP-complete problem. We address this problem by
efficiently transforming the input AND/OR graph-based model
into a weighted logical formula that is then used to build and solve
a Weighted Partial MaxSAT problem. The benchmark includes
80 cases with AND/OR graphs of different size and composition
as well as the optimal cost and solution for each case.
I. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
Over the last years, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such
as water treatment plants and energy facilities have become
increasingly exposed to a wide range of cyber-physical threats,
having massive destructive consequences. Our work is focused
on security metrics and techniques that can be used to measure
and improve the security posture of ICS environments [1].
We use AND/OR graphs to model these systems as they
allow more realistic representations of the complex interdepen-
dencies among cyber-physical components that are normally
involved in real-world settings [2], [3]. In that context, we have
designed a security metric, detailed in [1], whose objective is
to identify the set of critical AND/OR nodes (ICS network
components) that must be compromised in order to disrupt the
operation of the system, with minimal cost for the attacker.
From a graph-theoretical perspective, our security metric
looks for a minimal weighted vertex cut in AND/OR graphs.
This is an NP-complete problem as shown in [3], [4], [5].
While well-known algorithms such as Max-flow Min-cut [6]
and variants of it could be used to estimate such metric over
OR graphs in polynomial time, their use for general AND/OR
graphs is not evident nor trivial as they may fail to capture
the underlying logical semantics of the graph. In that context,
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we take advantage of state-of-the-art MaxSAT techniques to
address our problem.
II. SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Let us consider a simple ICS network whose operational
dependencies are represented by the AND/OR graph shown in
Figure 1. The graph reads as follows: the actuator c1 depends
on the output of software agent d. Agent d in turn has two
alternatives to work properly; it can use either the readings of
sensor a and the output from agent b together, or the output
from agent b and the readings of sensor c together. In addition,
each cyber-physical component has an associated attack cost
that represents the effort required by an attacker to compromise
that component. Now, considering these costs, the question we
are trying to answer is: which nodes should be compromised
in order to disrupt the operation of actuator c1, with minimal
effort (cost) for the attacker? In other words, what is the least-
effort attack strategy to disable actuator c1?
Fig. 1. AND/OR graph with sensors, software agents and actuators
Our example involves many attack alternatives, however,
only one is minimal. The optimal strategy is to compromise
nodes a and c with a total cost of 4. The compromise of these
sensors will disable both AND nodes and consecutively the OR
node, which in turn will affect node d and finally node c1.
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III. MAXSAT FORMULATION STRATEGY
Given a target node t, the input graph G can be used
as a map to decode the dependencies that node t relies on.
Therefore, G can be traversed backwards in order to produce
a propositional formula that represents the different ways in
which node t can be fulfilled. We call this transformation
fG(t). In our example, fG(c1) is as follows:
fG(c1) = c1 ∧ (d ∧ ((a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c)))
The goal of the attacker, however, is precisely the opposite,
i.e., to disrupt node c1 somewhere along the graph. There-
fore, we are actually interested in satisfying ¬fG(c1), which
describes the means to disable c1. After applying a few logical
rules, the conjunctive normal form (CNF) of ¬fG(c1) is:
¬fG(c1) = (¬c1 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬b) ∧ (¬c1 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬b ∨ ¬c)
In practice, we do not use the naive CNF conversion
approach since it might lead to exponential computation times
over large graphs. Instead, we use the Tseitin transforma-
tion [7], which can be done in polynomial time and essentially
produces a new formula in CNF that is not strictly equivalent
to the original formula (because there are new variables) but
is equisatisfiable. This means that, given an assignment of
truth values, the new formula is satisfied if and only if the
original formula is also satisfied. Under that perspective, a
logical assignment such that ¬fG(t) = true will indicate
which nodes must be compromised (i.e. logically falsified) in
order to disrupt the operation of the system.
Considering the CNF formula produced by the Tseitin
transformation and a cost function ϕ(n) that indicates the
attack cost of a node n, we model our problem as a Weighted
Partial MaxSAT problem [8]. Hard clauses are essentially the
clauses within the CNF formula:
¬c1 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬b ¬c1 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬b ∨ ¬c
whereas soft clauses correspond to each atomic node in the
graph with their corresponding penalties (costs) as follows:
a b c d c1
ϕ(a) = 2 ϕ(b) = 5 ϕ(c) = 2 ϕ(d) = 10 ϕ(c1) = inf
Therefore, a MaxSAT solver will try to minimise the number
of falsified variables as well as their weights, which in our
problem equals to minimise the compromise cost for the
attacker. Note: the additional variables introduced by the
Tseitin transformation have cost/weight 0 in the formulation.
IV. AND/OR GRAPH GENERATION
The benchmark presented in this paper relies on
META4ICS, a Java-based security metric analyser for ICS [1],
[9]. We have used META4ICS to produce and analyse syn-
thetic pseudo-random AND/OR graphs of different size and
composition. To create an AND/OR graph of size n, we first
create the target node. Afterwards, we create a predecessor
which has one of the three types (atomic, AND, OR) accord-
ing to a probability given by a compositional configuration
predefined for the experiment. For example, a configuration of
(60, 20, 20) means 60% of atomic nodes, 20% of AND nodes
and 20% of OR nodes. We repeat this process creating children
on the respective nodes until we approximate the desired size
of the graph n. Node costs, represented by ϕ(n), are integer
values randomly selected between 1 and 100.
The benchmark also includes the solutions obtained by
META4ICS for each case, including resolution time, total cost
and critical nodes. Currently, META4ICS uses SAT4J [10]
and a Python-based linear programming approach as MaxSAT
solvers. The tool runs all available solvers in parallel and picks
the first one that comes up with a valid solution.
V. BENCHMARK DESCRIPTION
Out dataset includes 80 cases in total, and can be obtained
at [9]. There are four different sizes of AND/OR graphs
involving 5000, 10000, 15000, and 20000 nodes (20 cases
each). For each graph size, we consider two different graph
configurations, 80/10/10 and 60/20/20, which determine the
composition of the graphs (10 cases each). Table I shows the
identifiers of the cases within each one of these categories.
Nodes/Configurations 80/10/10 config 60/20/20 config
5000 1 to 10 11 to 20
10000 21 to 30 31 to 40
15000 41 to 50 51 to 60
20000 61 to 70 71 to 80
TABLE I
BENCHMARK CASES AND CONFIGURATIONS
Each case is specified in an individual .wcnf (DIMACS-like,
weighted CNF) file named with the case id and the number of
nodes involved. The weight for hard clauses (top value) has
been set to 1.0×106. Tables II and III detail each case as well
as the results obtained with our tool. The field id identifies
each case; gNodes indicates the total number of nodes in
the original AND/OR graph; gAT, gAND and gOR indicate
the approximate composition of the graph in terms of atomic
(cyber-physical components), AND and OR nodes; tsVars
and tsClauses show the number of variables and clauses
involved in the MaxSAT formulation after applying the Tseitin
transformation; cost and time show the total solution cost
reported by META4ICS and the time needed for its resolution
in milliseconds; solution shows the set of critical nodes ex-
pressed as a list of nodes with their respective costs (weights).
These experiments have performed on a MacBook Pro (15-
inch, 2018), 2.9 GHz Intel Core i9, 32 GB 2400 MHz DDR4.
As a final remark, it can be observed that some cases with
the same size and composition parameters have very different
resolution times. This is an interesting phenomenon and it is
due to the internal logical composition of the AND/OR graph
and how well the underlying solver performs with each case.
Within our experiments, we have observed that none of the two
solvers used in META4ICS is faster than the other in all of the
cases. We believe this is an interesting problem that should be
further investigated in the context of MaxSAT solvers.
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id gNodes gAT gAND gOR tsVars tsClauses cost time solution
1 5000 3986 540 475 8987 23990 20 1045 [(2:9),(5120:4),(8900:4),(8904:3)]
2 5000 4015 515 471 9016 24019 3 863 [(940:1),(3390:1),(3424:1)]
3 5000 3997 514 490 8998 24001 1 847 [(7950:1)]
4 5000 3982 506 513 8983 23986 3 850 [(874:2),(5081:1)]
5 5000 4018 503 480 9019 24022 2 837 [(6:2)]
6 5000 4013 514 474 9014 24017 3 855 [(5235:3)]
7 5000 4004 500 497 9005 24008 1 840 [(4:1)]
8 5000 3999 508 494 9000 24003 5 831 [(8796:5)]
9 5000 4010 502 489 9011 24014 2 827 [(6219:2)]
10 5000 3973 531 497 8974 23977 9 838 [(7:3),(6319:1),(6859:5)]
11 5000 3008 1025 968 8009 23012 8 825 [(1033:6),(4416:2)]
12 5000 3020 1020 961 8021 23024 1 820 [(3366:1)]
13 5000 3017 969 1015 8018 23021 100 2157 [(2:6),(5192:7),(6527:28),(7195:3),(7236:20),(7500:7),
(7556:10),(7919:10),(7943:3),(7950:2),(7972:4)]
14 5000 3026 981 994 8027 23030 3 823 [(2:3)]
15 5000 3027 971 1003 8028 23031 16 823 [(2:16)]
16 5000 3004 1013 984 8005 23008 2 826 [(7497:2)]
17 5000 3017 1053 931 8018 23021 7 827 [(5844:7)]
18 5000 3021 996 984 8022 23025 22 822 [(6103:5),(6119:17)]
19 5000 3022 991 988 8023 23026 26 828 [(4118:7),(4144:19)]
20 5000 3011 988 1002 8012 23015 17 816 [(17:10),(549:4),(5846:3)]
21 10000 8017 1021 963 18018 48021 1 1033 [(456:1)]
22 10000 7991 1003 1007 17992 47995 17 911 [(2:17)]
23 10000 8023 987 991 18024 48027 2 894 [(365:2)]
24 10000 8035 967 999 18036 48039 57 4398 [(10137:2),(11192:2),(14319:1),(4:14),(607:2),(7746:9),
(7780:2),(7871:2),(8108:12),(8307:5),(9879:2),(9909:4)]
25 10000 7996 1054 951 17997 48000 4 927 [(6:4)]
26 10000 7967 1006 1028 17968 47971 9 908 [(11920:7),(17849:2)]
27 10000 7954 1038 1009 17955 47958 2 858 [(14335:2)]
28 10000 8013 1011 977 18014 48017 22 917 [(9:6),(428:1),(549:4),(679:7),(8781:2),(15313:2)]
29 10000 8008 967 1026 18009 48012 5 862 [(149:3),(190:2)]
30 10000 8026 1023 952 18027 48030 1 884 [(4553:1)]
31 10000 6035 1996 1970 16036 46039 289 4206 [(13217:8),(15933:12),(2:29),(2362:2),(2573:1),(3452:20),
(3510:8),(3552:35),(4168:12),(4187:29),(4226:1),(4438:78),
(4664:51),(5550:2),(6920:1)]
32 10000 6028 1989 1984 16029 46032 22 859 [(3:22)]
33 10000 6058 2015 1928 16059 46062 1 849 [(13604:1)]
34 10000 6012 2001 1988 16013 46016 3 850 [(11999:3)]
35 10000 6055 1958 1988 16056 46059 8 851 [(2:8)]
36 10000 5993 1954 2054 15994 45997 33 855 [(14291:2),(14602:28),(14991:3)]
37 10000 6064 1927 2010 16065 46068 4 850 [(6:4)]
38 10000 6015 1993 1993 16016 46019 289 4965 [(10212:1),(10217:41),(10224:14),(10253:21),(10303:4),(10588:8),
(11576:19),(11974:36),(12267:10),(12396:3),(12724:1),(12794:21),
(12846:4),(12934:15),(13374:1),(13850:17),(14318:19),(15239:1),
(15272:2),(3169:2),(3794:20),(3862:1),(3934:8),(4090:8),
(8243:5),(8248:4),(9905:3)]
39 10000 6012 1946 2043 16013 46016 4 856 [(11750:4)]
40 10000 6042 1956 2003 16043 46046 1 858 [(4548:1)]
TABLE II
BENCHMARK DESCRIPTION - CASES 1 TO 40
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id gNodes gAT gAND gOR tsVars tsClauses cost time solution
41 15000 11999 1498 1504 27000 72003 5 1152 [(3095:2),(25236:1),(25957:2)]
42 15000 12016 1527 1458 27017 72020 2 982 [(26790:2)]
43 15000 11983 1454 1564 26984 71987 6 1095 [(23:4),(25147:2)]
44 15000 11936 1561 1504 26937 71940 1 939 [(6:1)]
45 15000 12006 1528 1467 27007 72010 1 955 [(4963:1)]
46 15000 11995 1465 1541 26996 71999 34 2968 [(6:25),(22122:1),(22891:6),(23040:2)]
47 15000 11973 1507 1521 26974 71977 2 932 [(4:2)]
48 15000 12021 1490 1490 27022 72025 36 1092 [(76:4),(416:20),(2148:1),(9656:4),(17438:1),(23881:6)]
49 15000 11957 1528 1516 26958 71961 4 916 [(14464:2),(24824:2)]
50 15000 12009 1518 1474 27010 72013 10 992 [(10163:1),(19872:1),(22070:3),(26038:5)]
51 15000 9057 2979 2965 24058 69061 214 6335 [(11377:5),(16191:11),(17087:52),(17422:3),(18195:16),(18367:4),
(18383:1),(18593:6),(18991:3),(19054:5),(19448:3),(19551:32),
(21785:1),(21807:10),(22034:8),(22087:32),(23437:15),
(6815:3),(6919:4)]
52 15000 9072 2949 2980 24073 69076 49 1024 [(2:1),(14480:7),(17852:41)]
53 15000 9023 3072 2906 24024 69027 10 940 [(1425:6),(20681:4)]
54 15000 9062 2973 2966 24063 69066 45 2000 [(6912:4),(9199:25),(12387:13),(13814:2),(14190:1)]
55 15000 9006 2983 3012 24007 69010 100 4397 [(1496:1),(4027:6),(5220:2),(5781:1),(16796:89),(21242:1)]
56 15000 9050 2936 3015 24051 69054 138 7839 [(11358:4),(1460:7),(16765:3),(3845:81),(666:8),
(7936:1),(8733:8),(8870:18),(8959:8)]
57 15000 9039 2996 2966 24040 69043 11 924 [(12114:9),(12732:2)]
58 15000 9057 2967 2977 24058 69061 66 8208 [(16552:13),(2:53)]
59 15000 9047 3034 2920 24048 69051 11 1015 [(3226:4),(21769:7)]
60 15000 9036 2963 3002 24037 69040 116 8376 [(11185:6),(12042:16),(12906:26),(13556:1),
(13652:7),(14234:8),(2:52)]
61 20000 16012 2010 1979 36013 96016 16 4456 [(77:2),(7769:5),(18831:1),(24368:8)]
62 20000 15998 2039 1964 35999 96002 1 1020 [(12:1)]
63 20000 15962 2045 1994 35963 95966 14 1134 [(1370:6),(2437:1),(9642:1),(26442:4),(28443:2)]
64 20000 15961 2026 2014 35962 95965 4 1004 [(14:4)]
65 20000 16053 1999 1949 36054 96057 2 1014 [(11:2)]
66 20000 16028 1983 1990 36029 96032 1 960 [(30735:1)]
67 20000 15983 2050 1968 35984 95987 1 1020 [(8:1)]
68 20000 15979 2006 2016 35980 95983 20 4334 [(1147:2),(3275:2),(7063:1),(7351:5),(9616:3),
(14569:1),(23153:4),(25514:1),(26598:1)]
69 20000 16008 1990 2003 36009 96012 18 2736 [(5:18)]
70 20000 16119 1921 1961 36120 96123 5 978 [(4:5)]
71 20000 12068 3848 4085 32069 92072 25 1034 [(2:25)]
72 20000 12028 3962 4011 32029 92032 3 983 [(31797:3)]
73 20000 12054 4046 3901 32055 92058 7 1006 [(22596:5),(22673:1),(24195:1)]
74 20000 12051 4033 3917 32052 92055 28 1094 [(26825:4),(29603:3),(30184:20),(30210:1)]
75 20000 12103 3993 3905 32104 92107 5 965 [(19799:5)]
76 20000 12000 4004 3997 32001 92004 9 995 [(15575:3),(17158:6)]
77 20000 12127 3851 4023 32128 92131 18 976 [(2821:3),(4451:13),(9408:2)]
78 20000 11957 4006 4038 31958 91961 2 938 [(12459:1),(20894:1)]
79 20000 12073 3964 3964 32074 92077 49 1757 [(20965:47),(24362:2)]
80 20000 12048 3940 4013 32049 92052 50 1432 [(2537:4),(7471:2),(7483:8),(15594:5),(22496:1),(23848:2),
(27795:9),(28554:19)]
TABLE III
BENCHMARK DESCRIPTION - CASES 41 TO 80
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